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The Strange Double Life of Canadian
Equality Rights
Bruce Ryder*

I. DOCTRINAL DIVERGENCE: THE LAW AND MEIORIN
RULINGS OF 1999
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada issued two important rulings
on equality rights that ambitiously sought to reshape the law in their
respective realms. One, Law v. Canada,1 concerned constitutional
equality rights. The other, British Columbia (Public Service Employee
Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU (“Meiorin”),2 involved statutory
equality rights. The contrast between how the Court approached the task
of defining equality rights in these two realms was stark.
In Law, the Court dismissed a challenge brought by Nancy Law,
based on section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,3
to provisions of the Canada Pension Plan that denied her a survivor pension because she was under the age of 35 at the time of her spouse’s
death. Ms. Law could have sought redress through the Canadian Human
Rights Act, which, like the anti-discrimination statutes in every Canadian
jurisdiction, prohibits age discrimination in the provision of services, a
prohibition that applies to both private and public actors.4 She chose instead to pursue her claim in court based on the Charter.

*

Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999]
1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Law”].
2
British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia
Government and Service Employees’ Union (BCGSEU) (“Meiorin Grievance”), [1999] S.C.J.
No. 46, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Meiorin”].
3
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
4
See s. 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6; Canada Pension Plan,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8.
1
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The provisions challenged in Law imposed differential treatment on
the basis of age, a ground of discrimination listed in section 15. Justice
Iacobucci, writing for a unanimous Court, took the opportunity to develop an elaborate theory for determining when disadvantageous
distinctions drawn on prohibited grounds are discriminatory and thus
infringe section 15(1). On the test he put forward, Nancy Law had to establish that a reasonable person in her position would find that the
legislative imposition of differential treatment had the effect of demeaning her human dignity.5 The inquiry into human dignity in turn required a
consideration of four contextual factors.6 Justice Iacobucci’s 10-point
summary of the general approach consumed five pages in the Supreme
Court Reports.7 He concluded that the challenged provisions took into
account a correspondence between the age of a surviving spouse and the
existence of long-term financial need.8 For this reason, the provisions did
not demean the dignity of relatively young surviving spouses, and therefore did not amount to discrimination. Since the claimant had not
established an infringement of section 15(1), the government was not
called upon to justify the challenged legislation pursuant to section 1 of
the Charter.
Six months later, the Court issued its ruling in Meiorin. The case involved a challenge by Tawney Meiorin, a forest firefighter, to her
dismissal after she failed to pass a mandatory aerobic test introduced by
the government. Ms. Meiorin argued that the aerobic standard discriminated on the basis of sex as women had more difficulty meeting it than
men. Because she was employed by the government and was challenging
a government policy, Ms. Meiorin could have based her challenge on
section 15(1) of the Charter, and sought a remedy in court. She chose
instead to pursue her claim before the British Columbia Human Rights
Tribunal, relying on the statutory prohibition on sex discrimination in
employment set out in the B.C. Human Rights Code.9
Writing for a unanimous Court in Meiorin, McLachlin J. (as she
then was) had no difficulty concluding that the aerobic test was
5

Supra, note 1, at para. 75.
The four contextual factors are: (1) pre-existing disadvantage; (2) the correspondence
between the ground of discrimination at issue and the relevant characteristics or circumstances of the
claimant; (3) the ameliorative purpose or effects of the challenged law or policy; and (4) the
importance of the interest at stake. Id., at paras. 62-75.
7
Id., at para. 88.
8
Id., at paras. 104-108.
9
Section 13(1) of the Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210.
6
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discriminatory. She applied the test for establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination set out in O’Malley v. Simpsons-Sears: did the challenged
rule impose adverse differential treatment at least in part on the basis of a
prohibited ground?10 To meet the O’Malley test, the claimant’s burden of
proof consists of proving the following three elements on the balance of
probabilities: (1) he or she is a member of a group identified by one or
more prohibited grounds of discrimination; (2) he or she was subjected to
adverse differential treatment; and (3) a prohibited ground was a factor in
the adverse differential treatment.11 It followed that if Tawney Meiorin
could establish that her inability to pass the aerobics test was at least in
part related to her sex, then she would discharge her burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination and the burden of
establishing a defence or justification would then shift to the respondent.
Applying this test, it took McLachlin J. just a few swift sentences to
conclude that Ms. Meiorin had established that the aerobic standard had a
differential adverse impact on women.12 The labour arbitrator had found
that “most women are adversely affected by the high aerobic standard”.
Therefore, McLachlin J. wrote, Ms. Meiorin “demonstrated that the
aerobic standard is prima facie discriminatory”.13 The burden then
shifted to the government to justify the standard. Justice McLachlin
found that the government had not demonstrated that the rule was reasonably necessary to ensuring that forest firefighters are able to work
safely and efficiently.14 The Court ordered that Ms. Meiorin be reinstated,
with compensation for lost wages and benefits, because her dismissal
was based on a discriminatory standard.15

10
Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Simpsons-Sears, [1985] S.C.J. No. 74, [1985] 2
S.C.R. 536, at 551-52 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “O’Malley”]. See also British Columbia (Superintendent
of Motor Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), [1999] S.C.J. No. 73, [1999] 3
S.C.R. 868 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grismer”].
11
The O’Malley test is frequently stated in these terms. For a recent example, see Shaw v.
Phipps, [2012] O.J. No. 2601, 289 O.A.C. 163, at para. 14 (Ont. C.A.). See also the discussion in
Peel Law Assn. v. Pieters, [2013] O.J. No. 2695, 116 O.R. (3d) 81, at paras. 53-62 (Ont. C.A.),
affirming the application of the test as stated in Shaw v. Phipps.
12
In Grismer, supra, note 10, a case decided a few months after Meiorin, one sentence was
all it took for the Court to conclude that the visually impaired claimant had established a prima facie
case of discrimination: “Mr. Grismer established a prima facie case of discrimination under the Act
by showing that he was denied a [driver’s] licence that was available to others, and that the denial
was made on the basis of a physical disability.” Id., at para. 23.
13
Meiorin, supra, note 2, at para. 69.
14
Id., at para. 83.
15
Id., at para. 84.
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Law and Meiorin were unanimous rulings of the Court. Both disposed of challenges to government rules that imposed adverse
differential treatment based on prohibited grounds of discrimination. In
Law, the Court’s entire discussion is devoted to concluding that the adverse differential treatment on a prohibited ground did not amount to
discrimination. In Meiorin, the Court quickly found that the adverse differential treatment on a prohibited ground amounted to prima facie
discrimination. Its discussion was focused on whether the government
could justify the rule. The Law opinion is consumed by the problem of
defining discrimination; the Meiorin opinion had no difficulty finding
prima facie discrimination, and focused instead on clarifying the test for
justification.16 In Meiorin, the Court held the government to account,
calling on it to explain the necessity of a discriminatory rule. In Law, the
Court did not require the government to justify the challenged rule pursuant to section 1 of the Charter.
In Meiorin, McLachlin J. did not mention the elaborate human dignity test the Court had put forward for determining discrimination in the
Charter context in the Law ruling earlier in the same year. In Law,
Iacobucci J. did not mention the less burdensome O’Malley test for establishing prima facie discrimination that operates in the statutory
context. The two rulings simply did not speak to each other.
In many ways the tests for discrimination expounded in the statutory
and constitutional contexts coincide: ever since Andrews,17 the Court’s
first ruling interpreting section 15 of the Charter, the Court has
emphasized that section 15 and Human Rights Codes have the common
purpose of overcoming substantive discrimination. In defining
discrimination under the Charter, the Court has been inspired and guided
from the outset by jurisprudence developed by Canadian human rights
tribunals and courts when interpreting statutory prohibitions on
discrimination in Human Rights Codes. In McIntyre J.’s discussion of
the meaning of discrimination in Andrews, he began with a brief overview
of the history of Canadian Human Rights Codes,18 stated that “there is
little difficulty … in isolating an acceptable definition” from the case law
16

Once a claimant has established prima facie discrimination, the Court held that an
employer may justify an impugned rule by establishing that it is rationally connected to job
performance, has been adopted in an honest and good faith belief, and is reasonably necessary in the
sense that it is impossible to accommodate employees without undue hardship. Id., at para. 54.
17
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Andrews”].
18
Id., at 172.
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interpreting the Codes,19 and cited the O’Malley ruling for its definition
of discrimination as adverse differential treatment on the basis of a
prohibited ground.20 He also adopted the definitions of adverse-effects
discrimination and systemic discrimination from O’Malley and Action
Travail des Femmes,21 respectively,22 establishing that a substantive
conception of discrimination, focused on effects that exacerbate the
subordination of historically disadvantaged groups, would henceforth
guide Canadian anti-discrimination law in both the statutory and
constitutional realms. Furthermore, he took the position that, in general,
“the principles which have been applied under the Human Rights Acts
are equally applicable in considering questions of discrimination under s.
15(1)”.23 In particular, he noted, “discrimination under s. 15(1) will be of
the same nature and in descriptive terms will fit the concept
of discrimination developed under the Human Rights Acts”.24
Despite the emphasis on a harmonized approach to the definition of
discrimination in Andrews, some passages in McIntyre J.’s opinion
hinted that section 15 claimants might have to establish something more
than adverse differential treatment on the basis of a prohibited ground of
discrimination. That added requirement turned out to be a violation of
human dignity according to the Law ruling, and, later, according to
Kapp25 and Withler,26 the operation of prejudice or stereotype. The added
requirement might seem to be a minor wrinkle on otherwise identical
statutory and constitutional tests. Perhaps that is true on the page. But, in
practice, judges have interpreted this added element in a manner that has
turned it into a formidable barrier for claimants. The human dignity requirement, or more recently, the requirement of proving the operation of
prejudice or stereotype, has been the fulcrum on which many section 15
claims have turned.
Justice Iacobucci intimated in Law that it would be “rare” for a court
not to find discrimination if a claimant establishes adverse differential

19

Id., at 173.
Id.
21
Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission),
[1987] S.C.J. No. 42, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Action Travail des Femmes”].
22
Andrews, supra, note 17, at 173-74.
23
Id., at 175.
24
Id., at 176.
25
R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kapp”].
26
Withler v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 12, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Withler”].
20
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treatment on a prohibited ground.27 How wrong this prediction has proven
to be. Half of the Supreme Court of Canada’s post-Law section 15
decisions are precisely the kind that Iacobucci J. supposed would be
“rare” — that is, cases where the Court found that adverse differential
treatment on prohibited grounds did not amount to discrimination
because the claimant failed to demonstrate a violation of human dignity
or the operation of prejudice or stereotype.28 If these claims had been
adjudicated according to the O’Malley/Meiorin allocation of burdens of
proof, the claimants would have succeeded in demonstrating a prima
facie case of discrimination, and the burden of justification would have
then fallen on the government respondents. In Charter litigation,
governments are frequently absolved by courts adjudicating section 15
claims of any duty to explain the need for laws or policies that impose
adverse differential treatment on the members of historically

27

Law, supra, note 1, at para. 110.
Examples from the Supreme Court’s post-Law jurisprudence include, in reverse
chronological order: Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v. Cunningham, [2011]
S.C.J. No. 37, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 670 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cunningham”] (adverse differential
treatment of status Indians not discriminatory); Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J.
No. 20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Fraser”] (adverse differential treatment of
agricultural workers not discriminatory); Withler, supra, note 26 (adverse differential treatment on
the basis of age not discriminatory); Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J.
No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hutterian Brethren”] (adverse differential
treatment on the basis of religion not discriminatory); C. (A.) v. Manitoba (Director of Child and
Family Services), [2009] S.C.J. No. 30, 309 D.L.R. (4th) 581 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “C. (A.)”]
(adverse differential treatment on the basis of age not discriminatory); Ermineskin Indian Band and
Nation v. Canada, [2009] S.C.J. No. 9, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 222 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ermineskin”]
(adverse differential treatment of Indian bands not discriminatory); Kapp, supra, note 25 (adverse
differential treatment on the basis of race not discriminatory); Health Services and Support Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R.
391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Health Services”] (adverse differential treatment on the basis of sex not
discriminatory); Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2004] S.C.J.
No. 60, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 357 (S.C.C.) (adverse differential treatment on the basis of marital status not
discriminatory); Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney
General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.) (adverse differential treatment on the
basis of age not discriminatory); Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh, [2002] S.C.J. No. 84,
[2002] 4 S.C.R. 325 (S.C.C.) (adverse differential treatment on the basis of marital status not
discriminatory); Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429
(S.C.C.) (adverse differential treatment on the basis of age not discriminatory); Lovelace v. Ontario,
[2000] S.C.J. No. 36, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 (S.C.C.) (adverse differential treatment on the basis of
Aboriginal band status not discriminatory); Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [2000] S.C.J. No. 29, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703 (S.C.C.) (adverse differential treatment on
the basis of physical disability not discriminatory); Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric
Institute), [1999] S.C.J. No. 31, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 625 (S.C.C.) (adverse differential treatment on the
basis of mental disability not discriminatory).
28
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disadvantaged groups, or of explaining whether they considered
alternative, less burdensome means of accomplishing their objectives.
Ever since the strange double life of Canadian equality rights came
to the fore in the Court’s 1999 rulings, debate has raged in the case law
and legal scholarship about whether the constitutional definition of discrimination should infiltrate the statutory realm.29 Yet the Supreme Court
of Canada has remained curiously silent on the issue. The Court continues to cite the O’Malley test in the statutory realm30 and the Court has
applied a more burdensome test in the constitutional realm.
To better align its jurisprudence with section 15’s objective of promoting substantive equality, in Kapp31 and Withler32 the Court reduced
the burdens on equality rights claimants by eliminating the need to prove
a violation of human dignity, and by eliminating the need to rely on proof
of discriminatory treatment compared to a single, correct “mirror comparator group”. The Court restated the test for establishing a violation of
section 15(1) in simpler terms than the prolix Law test: “(1) Does the law

29
The leading case in Ontario was, until the past year, Ontario (Director, Disability
Support Program) v. Tranchemontagne, [2010] O.J. No. 3812, 102 O.R. (3d) 97 (Ont. C.A.)
[hereinafter “Tranchemontagne”]. For reasons discussed below, Simmons J.’s Charter-inflected
revision of the test for establishing discrimination in the statutory realm is no longer reliable after the
Supreme Court’s rulings in Moore, infra, note 35, and Quebec v. A., infra, note 34. For excellent
discussions of the issues and case law, see A. Wayne MacKay, “The Marriage of Human Rights
Codes and Section 15 of the Charter in Pursuit of Equality: A Case for Greater Separation in Both
Theory and Practice” (2013) U.N.B.L.J. (forthcoming) [hereinafter “MacKay”]; Denise Réaume,
“Defending the Human Rights Codes from the Charter” (2012) 9 J.L.E. 67 [hereinafter “Réaume”];
Benjamin Oliphant, “Prima Facie Discrimination: Is Tranchemontagne Consistent with the Supreme
Court of Canada’s Human Rights Code Jurisprudence?” (2012) 9 J.L.E. 33 [hereinafter “Oliphant”];
Lesli Bisgould, “Twists and Turns and Seventeen Volumes of Evidence, or How Procedural
Developments Might Have Influenced Substantive Human Rights Law” (2012) 9 J.L.E. 5
[hereinafter “Bisgould”]; Leslie A. Reaume, “Postcards from O’Malley: Reinvigorating Statutory
Human Rights Jurisprudence in the Age of the Charter” [hereinafter “Reaume”] in Fay Faraday,
Margaret Denike & M. Kate Stephenson, eds., Making Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive
Equality Under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006), at 373-408 [hereinafter “Faraday, Denike &
Stephenson”]; Andrea Wright, “Formulaic Comparisons: Stopping the Charter at the Statutory
Human Rights Gate” [hereinafter “Wright”] in Faraday, Denike & Stephenson, id., at 409-41; Karen
Schucher & Judith Keene, Statutory Human Rights and Substantive Equality – Why and How to
Avoid the Injury of the Law Approach (Toronto: LEAF, 2007) [hereinafter “Schucher & Keene”];
Karen Schucher, “Human Rights Statutes as a Tool to Eliminate and Prevent Discrimination:
Reflections on the Supreme Court of Canada’s Jurisprudence” in Sanda Rodgers & Sheila McIntyre,
eds., The Supreme Court of Canada and Social Justice: Commitment, Retrenchment or Retreat
(Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2010), at 387-422.
30
See, e.g., New Brunswick (Human Rights Commission) v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan
Inc., [2008] S.C.J. No. 46, [2008] 2 S.C.R 604, at para. 49 (S.C.C.).
31
Kapp, supra, note 25.
32
Withler, supra note 26.
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create a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground?
(2) Does the distinction create a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice
or stereotyping?”33
Despite these changes, the contrast between the Court’s consistent,
confident, clear and succinct approach to the claimant’s burden in the realm
of statutory equality rights, and its fluctuating, verbose, demanding and
anxious approach to the claimant’s burden in the context of section 15(1) of
the Charter, remains striking, and strikingly evident in its two most
recent decisions dealing with equality rights. Just as Law and Meiorin
revealed the strange double life of equality rights in 1999, Quebec
(Attorney General) v. A.34 and Moore v. British Columbia (Education)35
are this past year’s Jekyll and Hyde. The four opinions in Quebec v. A.
are cumulatively as verbose and complex as Iacobucci J.’s opinion was in
Law, while Abella J.’s opinion in Moore is as incisive and clear as
McLachlin J.’s opinion was in Meiorin.
Before turning to a discussion of Moore and Quebec v. A., we will
explore several other features of the terrain on which these two rulings
landed. The discussion above outlined the doctrinal divergence in the
definitions of discrimination operating in the constitutional and statutory
realms. But we should be careful not to get caught up exclusively in parsing the words used in the different legal tests. The pattern of results
reached by courts and human rights tribunals may be more important
than the words they use to explain those results. The next section will
take a quick glance at data on courts and human rights tribunals’ disposition of equality rights cases in the constitutional and statutory realms.36

II. DIVERGENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
EQUALITY RIGHTS PRACTICE
One useful measure of the equality rights practice of courts and human rights tribunals is the rate at which claimants succeed in establishing
33

Kapp, supra, note 25, at para. 17; Withler, supra, note 26, at para. 30.
[2013] S.C.J. No. 5, 354 D.L.R. (4th) 191 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Quebec v. A.”].
[2012] S.C.J. No. 61, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Moore”].
36
I do not have data on the pattern of results when claims of discrimination in violation of
the Code or the Charter are raised before tribunals other than human rights tribunals. Since rulings
like Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), [2006] S.C.J. No. 14,
[2006] 1 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.) have dispersed responsibility for adjudicating equality rights claims
across the legal system, the need for empirical research investigating the results reached by other
tribunals deciding equality rights issues has taken on increased importance.
34
35
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claims of discrimination pursuant to section 15 of the Charter and
statutory prohibitions on discrimination, respectively. For data on outcomes in cases alleging violations of statutory prohibitions on
discrimination, I will focus on Ontario and British Columbia. I have focused on these two provinces because data is readily available in the
annual reports of their human rights tribunals, and, because they currently produce a much higher volume of anti-discrimination case law
than other Canadian jurisdictions.37
As set out in Table 1 below, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
issued 274 final rulings in cases involving new applications from 2009 to
2012. The Tribunal found discrimination in 110, or 40 per cent, of those
decisions.
Table 1: Number and Percentage of Human Rights Tribunal of
Ontario Rulings Finding Violations of Statutory
Equality Rights38
Year

Final Rulings

2009-10
2010-11
2011-12
Total

75
104
95
274

Discrimination
Found
29
41
40
110

Claimant’s
Success Rate
39%
39%
42%
40%

The numbers of final rulings released annually by the British
Columbia tribunal is about half of the number in Ontario; the percentage
of cases in which claimants have succeeded in establishing
37
B.C. and Ontario have adopted “direct access” models in their respective Human Rights
Codes. In a direct access model, applicants alleging discrimination contrary to human rights
legislation file their claims directly with the human rights tribunal, rather than with human rights
commissions as was previously the case, and remains the case, in most Canadian jurisdictions. In a
direct access model, commissions no longer have the power to dismiss applications, and all cases
proceed to a hearing before the tribunal. The result is a significant increase in the number of rulings,
and likewise a significant increase in the B.C. and Ontario tribunals’ contributions to equality rights
jurisprudence.
38
The statistics presented in this table are drawn from the annual reports of the
Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario. See Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, Annual Report 2009-10,
at 5; Social Justice Tribunals of Ontario, 2010-11 Annual Report, at 34, online:
<http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/stellent/groups/public/@abcs/@www/@sjc/documents/abstract/ec16019
2.pdf>; Social Justice Tribunals of Ontario, 2011-12 Annual Report, online:
<http://www.sjto.gov.on.ca/stellent/groups/public/@abcs/@www/@sjc/documents/abstract/ec16226
5.pdf>. See also Andrew Pinto, Report of the Ontario Human Rights Review 2012 (November 2012),
at 213 (“Appendix E: Tribunal Statistics”), online: http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/
about/pubs/human_rights/Pinto_human_rights_report_2012-ENG.pdf>.
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discrimination is very similar. As presented in Table 2 below, from 2003
(the year the “direct access” model came into force in that province) to
2012, the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal has issued 439 final rulings and
found discrimination in 181, or 41.2 per cent, of those rulings.
Table 2: Number and Percentage of B.C. Human Rights
Tribunal Rulings Finding Violations of Statutory
Equality Rights39
Year

Final Rulings

Discrimination Found

2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
2007-08
2008-09
2009-10
2010-11
2011-12
Total

23
39
53
76
45
72
48
38
45
439

15
19
21
28
15
26
20
18
19
181

Claimant’s
Success Rate
68%
48%
40%
36%
33%
36%
42%
47%
42%
41.2%

In a database I have compiled that includes all reported court rulings
I have found (through comprehensive searches on Quicklaw and CanLII)
that disposed of section 15 claims, the courts have found violations of
section 15 in 138, or 16.4 per cent, of 841 reported cases from January 1,
1990 to the time of writing (August 1, 2013). Unlike the stable claimants’
success rate before the B.C. and Ontario human rights tribunals presented
in Tables 1 and 2, the success rate of section 15 claimants has declined
sharply in recent years. Indeed, as indicated in Table 3 below, Charter
equality rights claimants’ success rate dropped to 11.6 per cent of reported cases in the five-year period from 2005 to 2009, and has fallen
even further since then, to 7.2 per cent.

39
The statistics presented in this table are drawn from the annual reports of the B.C. Human
Rights Tribunal, online: <http://www.bchrt.bc.ca/annual_reports/index.htm>. See B.C. Human
Rights Tribunal, Annual Report 2003-04, at 13, Annual Report 2004-05, at 16, Annual Report 200506, at 14, Annual Report 2006-07, at 17, Annual Report 2007-08, at 18, Annual Report 2008-09, at 21,
Annual Report 2009-10, at 19, online, id., Annual Report 2010-11, at 12, and Annual Report 201112, at 11.
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Table 3: Number and Percentage of Court Rulings Finding
Violations of Constitutional Equality Rights40
Years
1990-1994
1995-1999
2000-2004
2005-2009
2010-201341
Total

Dispositions of
Section 15
Claims
190
170
188
224
69
841

Unjustified
Violation of
Section 15 Found
29
37
41
26
5
138

Claimant’s
Success Rate
15.3%
21.7%
21.8%
11.6%
7.2%
16.4%

The small number of court rulings finding violations of Charter
equality rights over the course of the last decade is striking. As Taufiq
Hashmani and I observed in 2010, “to say that Charter equality rights are
not in judicial vogue is an understatement”.42 Judges have not shown any
greater enthusiasm for Charter equality rights since then.
In light of the lack of recent success achieved by section 15 claimants, and the significant costs involved in launching section 15 court
challenges, it is not surprising that the number of Charter equality claims
brought to the courts annually is declining precipitously. The number of
reported rulings by courts disposing of section 15 claims hovered around
40 annually from 1990 to 2009. Since then the number of section 15 rulings issued by the courts has dropped by more than half. In the three-year
period from 2010 to 2012, the courts issued final rulings in 47 section 15
cases, an average of 16 annually.
The B.C. and Ontario human rights tribunals are issuing many more
final rulings on statutory equality rights than Canadian courts are issuing
rulings on constitutional equality rights, and are upholding statutory
equality rights claims at more than five times the current rate that the

40
The data presented in this table is drawn from the author’s database of all reported court
rulings finding a s. 15 claim to be established or not established. In cases where a s.15 claim is
raised, but not decided by a court, it is not included in the database. When a s. 15 case is appealed,
only the final appellate disposition of a s. 15 claim is included in the database.
41
This number includes rulings reported as of August 1, 2013.
42
Bruce Ryder & Taufiq Hashmani, “Managing Charter Equality Rights: The Supreme
Court of Canada’s Disposition of Leave to Appeal Applications in Section 15 Cases, 1989-2010”
(2010) 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 505, at 537 [hereinafter “Ryder & Hashmani”].
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courts are finding unjustified violations of Charter equality rights.43 Because of the small number of court rulings on section 15 of the Charter,
and the higher volume of rulings being issued by human rights tribunals
(led by Ontario and B.C.), the decisions of human rights tribunals interpreting statutory prohibitions on discrimination (and by courts on appeal
or judicial review) are currently exerting the primary influence on the
development of anti-discrimination law as a whole. At the tribunal level
in Ontario and B.C., the influence consists of a relatively evenly balanced mix of decisions in favour of claimants and respondents (whether
that remains true in the courts on appeal or judicial review is a question
that deserves investigation). Court rulings interpreting section 15 of the
Charter, on the other hand, are relatively modest in number and the vast
majority — over 90 per cent in the last three years — find in favour of
respondents. The numbers raise a concern that a one-sided Charter law
and practice might be placing significant barriers in the way of section 15
claims, and may be acting as a brake on the relatively more balanced tribunal jurisprudence. The high cost of putting together the evidence and
legal arguments necessary to support a compelling constitutional equality
rights claim, and the cancellation of the Court Challenges Program in
2006, are no doubt factors that help explain the small numbers of recent
section 15 case law.
A word of caution is in order. The data presented above provides us
with a useful glimpse into the volume and patterns of decision-making in
litigation involving statutory equality rights before two provinces’ human
rights tribunals and constitutional equality rights in the courts, respectively. It would be a mistake to use this data to support the conclusion
that claims of discrimination have a much higher chance of success in the
statutory human rights system than under the Charter. This may be the
case, and it may be the general impression left with potential litigants
and their legal counsel surveying the track record of courts and tribunals
adjudicating equality rights. However, we cannot draw that conclusion
based solely on the disparity in the rates that human rights tribunals and
courts have upheld allegations of discrimination in their final rulings.
43

The pattern of results in human rights tribunal rulings has been presented here for only
two jurisdictions. Every Canadian jurisdiction has human rights legislation prohibiting
discrimination. Further research is needed to provide a fuller national picture of the results of human
rights tribunal adjudication across the country. As noted, the direct access models in force in B.C.
and Ontario give rise to a high volume of tribunal rulings. The number of human rights tribunal
rulings in other Canadian jurisdictions is much smaller, particularly in the less populous provinces.
Further research could explore whether the success rate of claimants varies between jurisdictions.
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The data I have presented is restricted to claims that have proceeded to a
tribunal hearing under the Human Rights Codes and to a court ruling on
section 15 of the Charter, respectively. Because of the procedural, evidentiary and substantive differences between the two bodies of antidiscrimination law, comparing equality rights claimants’ success rates
in final tribunal rulings and section 15 court rulings is like comparing
apples and oranges.
To take one difference, claims that proceed to a hearing and a final
ruling by a human rights tribunal are focused exclusively on establishing
discrimination and must have at least some merit, otherwise they would
have been dismissed summarily at an earlier stage of the proceedings. In
contrast, many section 15 claims raised in court are put forward as alternatives to the principal legal arguments, often by litigants clutching at
legal straws (for example, claimants facing deportation in immigration
proceedings) without adequate evidence or legal argument. Moreover,
the numbers presented in Table 3 include all court rulings dismissing
section 15 claims (whether on motions or in final rulings), while the
numbers presented in Tables 1 and 2 do not include summary dismissal
rulings by the B.C. and Ontario human rights tribunals in the statutory
human rights context. We should not be surprised, then, that the data I
have presented shows that equality rights claimants have a much higher
success rate in final rulings by human rights tribunals than when they
allege violations of section 15 of the Charter in court. We need to conduct more thorough investigation before drawing conclusions about
claimants’ comparative success rates in the statutory and constitutional
realms. To enable us to draw such conclusions, ideally future empirical
research will examine all equality rights claims entering each system and
their ultimate disposition at various stages of each process.
The plummeting number and success rate of section 15 claims
depicted in Table 3 is cause for concern in a society still riven by deep
structural inequalities on the basis of sex, race, ability and other
prohibited grounds of discrimination. The data provides strong support to
the argument made by some critical socio-legal scholars that many forms
of inequality are beyond the reach of constitutional rights discourse and
litigation.44 We have to be careful not to burden section 15 litigation with
unrealistic expectations: section 15 promises much, but has delivered
little, at least in direct litigation outcomes in the past decade. In the
44

See, e.g., Harry Arthurs & Brent Arnold, “Does the Charter Matter?” (2005) 11 Rev.
Const. Studies 37.
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current political and legal environment, even when the potential impacts
of section 15 claims are modest, and even when claims are supported by
strong legal arguments and a strong evidentiary record, the odds of
success in court are long. Claimants who are successful in challenges to
laws in lower courts have to be prepared for a long battle and potential
reversal on appeal. Consider, for example, that Quebec v. A. is the 10th
section 15 ruling in a row from the Supreme Court of Canada that found
for the respondent (that is, that rejected the claimant’s allegation that the
government unjustifiably violated his or her equality rights).45 In three of
those 10 rulings,46 the Court overturned appeal court rulings finding an
unjustified violation of section 15. Meanwhile, the Court has denied
leave to appeal to a number of cases where important section 15 claims
were rejected by courts of appeal.47 As Taufiq Hashmani and I have
found, respondents in section 15 cases are far more likely than claimants
to be granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, and far
more likely to be successful on appeal.48 When the Court has granted
leave to appeal in section 15 cases in recent years, it has affirmed its
commitment to interpreting section 15 in accordance with the objective
of promoting substantive equality and then has invariably proceeded to
find allegations of unjustified infringements of section 15 unfounded.49
The disparity between the Court’s stated commitment to substantive
equality and its deeds is disconcerting.
It may be that, at least in some jurisdictions, equality rights claimants
are more likely to receive sympathetic hearings from human rights tribunals than they are from the courts because of the human rights expertise
of tribunal members, the tribunals’ specialized institutional mandate and
legal culture, and the lower burdens placed on claimants by human rights
tribunals compared to the courts in Charter cases. Whether or not this is

45
Quebec v. A., supra, note 34; Cunningham, supra, note 28; Fraser, supra, note 28;
Withler, supra, note 26; Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 28; C. (A.), supra, note 28; Ermineskin,
supra, note 28; Kapp, supra, note 25; Baier v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673
(S.C.C.); and Health Services, supra, note 28.
46
Quebec v. A., id.; Cunningham, id.; Hutterian Brethren, id.
47
See the cases discussed in Ryder & Hashmani, supra, note 42, at 528-30. One of the most
recent examples is Pratten v. British Columbia, [2012] B.C.J. No. 2460, 357 D.L.R. (4th) 660
(B.C.C.A.) (dismissing a challenge to the provisions of the B.C. Adoption Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 5 that
give no rights to information about their biological fathers to persons conceived through donor
insemination), application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed, May 30, 2013.
48
Id., at 525-32.
49
Id., at 533.

(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d)

THE DOUBLE LIFE OF EQUALITY RIGHTS

275

true, an impression to that effect has been created by the pattern of decision-making in final rulings described above.
As a result, some equality rights claimants are voting with their feet,
eschewing the Charter, and filing claims with human rights tribunals instead. Human rights tribunals are increasingly being asked to consider
claims that aim to transform government laws and policies of general
application — claims, like Moore, that look and feel like traditional
Charter challenges. These claims are possible under Human Rights
Codes because their prohibitions on discrimination in services extend to
much of what government does. Claire Mummé has traced the expansion
since the 1980s of the definition of what counts as a service, resulting in
a huge area of overlap in the application of the Charter and statutory
Human Rights Codes.50 As Mummé notes, this growing area of overlap
has precipitated a debate on whether the tests for establishing discrimination in the statutory and constitutional realms ought to merge. If courts
and tribunals are essentially dealing with the same issues, the argument
goes, then the strange double life of Canadian equality rights should
come to an end. The test for determining whether discrimination has
been established should be the same in both realms.

III. TOWARDS A COMMON TEST FOR ESTABLISHING
DISCRIMINATION
1. Should the Test for Discrimination Differ in the Statutory and
Constitutional Contexts? Three Approaches
While discussions about the relationship between the statutory and
constitutional definitions of discrimination are as old as section 15 itself,
they took on added urgency after 1999, when the Law and Meiorin rulings set the jurisprudence in the two realms on separate paths. Three
approaches have dominated debates on the issue: one advocates a harmonized approach that applies the Charter test in all equality rights
litigation; a second seeks to maintain distinct tests in the statutory and
constitutional contexts; and a third supports a harmonized approach that
applies the O’Malley test in all equality rights litigation.
Respondents’ counsel have pushed hard for the first approach, arguing that there are no principled reasons for taking different approaches to
50

Claire Mummé, “At the Crossroads in Discrimination Law: How the Human Rights
Codes Overtook the Charter in Canadian Government Services Cases” (2012) 9 J.L. & Equality 103.
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the definition of discrimination in the statutory and constitutional realms.
Given the common underlying principles and objectives that have shaped
section 15 of the Charter and human rights codes, the case for a uniform
test of discrimination is a powerful one, as the Court has recognized ever
since Andrews. As more challenges to government laws and policies are
initiated before tribunals rather than courts, governments have urged that
the section 15 test, as articulated in Law, and later as articulated in Kapp,
should migrate with them. Claire Mummé has succinctly described the
impetus behind this line of argument:
The expanding reach of human rights statutes suggests that its
adjudicators now rival the superior courts as sites for public law
adjudication. … it is perhaps also exactly for this reason that the door
has opened to the use of constitutional jurisprudence in the statutory
framework and that judicial decision makers have been receptive to
claims of merger between these two instruments. Put simply, … a new
unease has emerged with using an administrative tribunal to review
legislative and executive decisions under a less deferential standard
51
than is brought to the same questions under the Charter.

Despite the energy and skill government lawyers (and other respondents’ counsel) have put into advancing this position, they have had
limited success. The problem is that, even if we accept the strong arguments they have presented for conceptual unity, they have not been able
to make a persuasive case for why the more burdensome Charter test,
rather than the O’Malley test, should be the one that prevails. The test
that should be adopted is the one that holds the most promise for advancing the underlying purpose of Canadian anti-discrimination law, the
promotion of substantive equality. The Supreme Court has recognized,
beginning in Kapp, that the Charter definition of discrimination has
proven overly burdensome to claimants and has hindered the pursuit of
substantive equality. To apply the Charter test to the statutory realm,
when the Court has embarked on an attempt to lower the burdens it imposes, would be to compound the problem the Court is trying to solve.
While the problems with the Charter test are well known and widely accepted, nobody has made a persuasive case that the O’Malley/Meiorin
tests and allocations of burdens are operating unfairly for applicants or
respondents in the adjudication of statutory claims.

51

Id., at 137.
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The second approach seeks to maintain different tests for establishing discrimination in the constitutional and statutory contexts. A number
of scholars have argued in favour of this position.52 For these scholars,
the strange double life of Canadian equality rights is not so strange after
all; it is explained by the different features, legal status and mechanisms
of enforcement of Human Rights Codes and the Charter. The primary
goal of this body of scholarship has been to defend the lower burden imposed on statutory equality rights claimants by the O’Malley test
compared to the burdens imposed on section 15 claimants by the Law
test (or later, the Kapp test).
The O’Malley test is defended in this literature as best suited to promoting the substantive equality objective of Human Rights Codes: it
maintains access to justice by not imposing unrealistic or costly burdens
on claimants, and it allocates burdens in accordance with the knowledge
and information-gathering capacities of the parties. Because this scholarship is focused on preventing the Charter test from colonizing the
statutory realm, it has devoted less attention, and sometimes none at all,
to considering whether there is a persuasive rationale for placing higher
burdens on equality rights claimants who make constitutional as opposed
to statutory claims. As the titles of articles by Andrea Wright and Denise
Réaume express it, the goal of this literature has been to “stop the Charter
at the human rights gate”, or “to defend human rights codes from the
Charter”.53 This defensive scholarship has not argued for a reconsideration of the Charter test itself.
The problem with the body of scholarship that supports divergent
tests for discrimination in the statutory and constitutional realms is that
the authors’ arguments against importing the more burdensome Law or
Kapp tests into the statutory jurisprudence are equally persuasive reasons
for not applying those tests in the constitutional context in the first place.
Access to justice concerns are equally if not more profound in the Charter context, given the high costs involved in litigation against the
government in court. It makes as much as sense to allocate burdens in
accordance with the parties’ knowledge and access to relevant facts in the
Charter context as it does under Human Rights Codes. While supporters
of divergent approaches to discrimination point to differences in the legal
52
See MacKay, supra, note 29; Réaume, supra, note 29; Oliphant, supra, note 29;
Bisgould, supra, note 29; Reaume, supra, note 29; Wright, supra, note 29; Schucher & Keene,
supra, note 29.
53
Wright, id.; Réaume, id.
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status, design and reach of Human Rights Codes and section 15, it is not
clear why any of those differences should impose higher burdens on
claimants seeking to demonstrate discrimination in constitutional cases.
Section 1 affords all of the flexibility courts need in balancing the protection of Charter rights and freedoms with the achievement of pressing
government objectives.
A third perspective accepts the desirability of adopting a common
test for establishing discrimination in both the statutory and constitutional spheres, but sees the O’Malley test, as subsequently refined and
developed in the case law interpreting human rights legislation, rather
than the tests put forward in the section 15 jurisprudence, as the normative position around which anti-discrimination law should coalesce.
Many scholars have argued that a major flaw of the courts’ section 15
jurisprudence is that it imports issues into the claimant’s burden of establishing discrimination that ought to be addressed as part of the
government’s burden of justification under section 1.54 The solution is to
require equality rights claimants to prove differential treatment on the
basis of a prohibited ground that imposes disadvantage in a prima facie
sense, at which point the burden shifts to the government to attempt to
justify the challenged law or policy pursuant to section 1.55 This approach is essentially identical to the O’Malley/Meiorin tests and the
division of evidentiary burdens that operates in the statutory realm.
A potential danger with the third approach is that it casts section 15’s
net too broadly in a manner that overshoots its substantive equality purpose. Writing in 2002, Arbour J. cautioned that a broad interpretation of
section 15 risked diluting the power of equality rights, and producing a
section 1 test that lacked rigour:
54

See, e.g., Beverley Baines, “Law v. Canada: Formatting Equality” (2000) 11 Const.
Forum 65, at 72; Christopher Bredt & Adam Dodek, ”Breaking the Law’s Grip on Equality: A New
Paradigm for Section 15” (2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 33, at 54 [hereinafter “Bredt & Dodek”]; Donna
Greschner, “Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality?” (2001) 27 Queen’s L.J. 299, at 306;
Daphne Gilbert, “Time to Regroup: Rethinking Section 15 of the Charter” (2003) 48 McGill L.J.
627; Caroline Hodes, “Dignity and the Conditions of Truth: What Equality Needs from Law” (2007)
19 C.J.W.L. 273, at 282; Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Scarborough, ON:
Carswell, 2007), student ed., at 1154-55; Jennifer Koshan & Jonettte Watson Hamilton,
“Meaningless Mantra: Substantive Equality After Withler” (2011-2012) 16 Rev. Const. Studies 31,
at 58; MacKay, supra, note 29; Sheila McIntyre, “Deference and Dominance: Equality Without
Substance” in Sheila McIntyre & Sanda Rodgers, eds., Diminishing Returns: Inequality and the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2006), at 95;
Paul-Erik Veel, “A New Direction in the Interpretation of Section 15(1)? A Case Comment on
R. v. Kapp” (2008) 6:1 J.L. & Equality 33.
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We must be careful, in our understandable eagerness to extend equality
rights as widely as possible, to avoid stripping those rights of any
meaningful content. Lack of care can only result in the creation of an
equality guarantee that is far-reaching but wafer-thin, an expansive but
insubstantial shield with which to fend off state incursions on our
56
dignity and freedom.

One answer to this concern is to insist that the O’Malley definition of
discrimination operate in both statutory and constitutional contexts in a
manner that is attentive to the substantive equality purpose of Canadian
anti-discrimination law. The burdens imposed by the O’Malley test are
appropriate for the adjudication of claims by members of historically
disadvantaged groups, as the government should have to justify the imposition of further disadvantage on those groups on the basis of prohibited grounds of discrimination. When equality rights claims are brought
by members of relatively advantaged groups, we can fairly ask for
evidence of substantive discrimination beyond the imposition of adverse
differential treatment on the basis of a prohibited ground.
In any case, Arbour J.’s concern that equality rights not be defined
too broadly does not resonate in the current context. The recent judicial
record gives rise to the opposite concern. As we have seen, fewer and
fewer section 15 claims are litigated, and, when they are, fewer and
fewer litigants succeed in putting governments to the test of justification.
A more expansive approach to section 15 is necessary to rescue it from
oblivion.
The debate on whether the tests for discrimination in the statutory
and constitutional realms should be harmonized was an important part of
the submissions made to the Court in Moore. Much of the factum of
intervener West Coast LEAF, for example, was devoted to defending the
statutory realm from being infiltrated by the more burdensome Charter
test of discrimination (the second approach described above).57 Another
intervener, the Canadian Constitution Foundation (“CCF”), succinctly
presented the case for harmonizing the divergent definitions of

56

Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] S.C.J. No. 24, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769, at para. 86 (S.C.C.). See
also the concerns about an understanding of equality rights that is too broad and too shallow
expressed by Denise Réaume in “The Relevance of Relevance to Equality Rights” (2006) 31
Queen’s L.J. 696.
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Factum of the Intervener West Coast Women’s Legal and Education Action Fund, online:
<http://www.westcoastleaf.org/userfiles/file/Intervener%20West%20Coast%20LEAF%20Factum.pdf>,
at paras. 10-26.
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discrimination by making the Charter test applicable in the statutory
realm (the first approach described above).58
In a telling moment during oral argument in Moore, counsel for the
CCF, Ranjan Agarwal, submitted that “the elephant in the room in this
case” is the relationship between the constitutional and statutory tests for
discrimination. He submitted that “this Court in its reasons should find
that the test for discrimination under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
is the same as the test for discrimination under the Human Rights
Code”.59 To which Abella J. interjected: “we’ve been saying that since
Andrews”. Mr. Agarwal replied that the situation was not so clear to
lower courts and tribunals. In forceful submissions, he urged the Court to
take the opportunity in its reasons in Moore to clarify the law by
expressly adopting a harmonized approach. Justice Abella remained
puzzled by these submissions, insisting that “there is no different test for
what discrimination means”.60 Mr. Agarwal, in other words, urged the
Court to move from the second to the first approach described above.
Justice Abella, in her comments, made it clear she is no supporter of the
strange double life of Canadian equality rights. Justice Abella believes
the law does and should embody a harmonized approach. As it turns out,
the harmonized approach she supports is just not the one Mr. Agarwal
was urging upon her. She favours the third approach described above.
Her opinions in Moore and Quebec v. A., as we shall see in the next
section, affirmed the operation of the O’Malley test for determining
discrimination in the statutory context, and moved the constitutional test
closer to it.
2. Moore and Quebec v. A.: Convergence in the Tests for
Establishing Discrimination
At issue in Moore was whether a school district and the B.C. Ministry of Education had discriminated against a student with a severe
learning disability, Jeffrey Moore, by failing to provide him with the intensive remedial instruction he needed for his dyslexia in his early school
58

Factum of the Intervener Canadian Constitution Foundation, online: <http://www.
canadianconstitutionfoundation.ca/files/31/Factum%20of%20the%20Intervener%20-%20Moore.pdf>,
at paras. 5-9.
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See the segment of the webcast of the oral argument in Moore v. British Columbia
beginning at 295:30, available at the Supreme Court of Canada website, online: <http://www.scccsc.gc.ca/case-dossier/info/webcast-webdiffusion-eng.aspx?cas=34040>.
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years. Before the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal, Mr. Moore argued that
the O’Malley test should be followed to determine whether the school
district and the province had discriminated against him.61 The government respondents argued that the Law “human dignity” test used to
interpret section 15 of the Charter at the time should apply because the
case “involved government action and allegations of systemic discrimination in the context of broad public policy issues in education”.62 As
mentioned above, this is a common strategy: governments and other respondents have been trying to import the more burdensome
constitutional test for discrimination into the statutory realm for some
time.
Tribunal Chair Heather MacNaughton acknowledged the existence of
uncertainty about whether the constitutional test articulated in Law applied in the statutory realm. She therefore decided to apply both the
O’Malley and the Law tests, and concluded that a prima facie case of
discrimination had been established regardless of the test applied.63 She
went on to find that the respondents had not met their burden of justifying the denial of intensive remedial instruction to Mr. Moore.
On judicial review, uncertainty about the applicable legal test continued. At the B.C. Superior Court, the Tribunal decision was reversed.
Relying heavily on Charter rulings such as Auton,64 Dillon J. found that
“[t]he Tribunal’s failure to identify and then to compare the appropriate
comparator group [other special education students] crucially tainted the
whole of the discrimination analysis”.65 On appeal to the B.C. Court of
Appeal, Mr. Moore’s appeal was dismissed.66 Citing the Charter case law
on mirror comparator groups (since repudiated by Withler),67 the majority opinion of Low J.A. agreed with Dillon J. that it was necessary for the
analysis to be shaped by an appropriate comparator group. In this case,
the appropriate comparator group was “special needs students other than

61
Moore v. British Columbia (Ministry of Education), [2005] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 580, 54
C.H.R.R. D/245, at para. 719 (B.C.H.R.T.).
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Id., at para. 722.
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Id., at para. 740.
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Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J.
No. 71, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 (S.C.C.).
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British Columbia (Ministry of Education) v. Moore, [2008] B.C.J. No. 348, 81 B.C.L.R.
(4th) 107, at para. 147 (B.C.S.C.).
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those with severe learning disabilities”.68 The evidence did not establish
differential treatment compared to this group. Justice Low concluded:
Jeffrey Moore and other severely learning disabled students were given
the same opportunity to receive a general education as was given to all
other students. To compare these students with the general student
population is to invite an enquiry into general education policy and its
application.69

Justice Rowles dissented. Like the Tribunal, she acknowledged the
existence of debate about the applicability of the Supreme Court of Canada’s section 15 jurisprudence to claims of discrimination brought under
human rights statutes.70 After canvassing the case law and competing
views, she concluded that “the proper approach to claims of discrimination under the Code is the traditional framework set out in O’Malley and
subsequently developed by statutory human rights jurisprudence”.71 She
noted that after the abandonment of the “human dignity” test in Kapp,
“the gap between the Charter approach to discrimination and the statutory human rights approach is arguably narrowing once again”.72 She
agreed with the Tribunal’s finding of prima facie discrimination, and
concluded that the school district “has not proven that it accommodated
Jeffrey and other severely learning disabled students to the point of undue hardship”.73
At the Supreme Court of Canada, Mr. Moore’s appeal was substantially allowed.74 Justice Abella wrote a powerful unanimous opinion on
behalf of the Court restoring the Tribunal’s finding that the school district
had discriminated against Mr. Moore. She strongly rejected the comparator group analysis applied by the B.C. courts. In her words,
Comparing Jeffrey only with other special needs students would mean
that the District could cut all special needs programs and yet be
immune from a claim of discrimination. It is not a question of who else
is or is not experiencing similar barriers. This formalism was one of the
75
potential dangers of comparator groups identified in Withler ...
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Instead, Abella J. characterized adequate special education services
as “the ramp that provides access to the statutory commitment to education made to all children in British Columbia”.76 The key question, she
wrote, is whether the failure to provide Mr. Moore with intensive remediation “was … an unjustified denial of meaningful access to the general
education to which students in British Columbia are entitled and, as a
result, discrimination”.77
In answering this question, Abella J. stated that the Tribunal had
properly applied the O’Malley/Meiorin test:
As the Tribunal properly recognized, to demonstrate prima facie discri
mination, complainants are required to show that they have a
characteristic protected from discrimination under the Code; that they
experienced an adverse impact with respect to the service; and that the
protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact. Once
a prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the
respondent to justify the conduct or practice, within the framework of
the exemptions available under human rights statutes. If it cannot be
justified, discrimination will be found to occur.78

Justice Abella made no mention of the fact that the Tribunal had also
applied the Law test. In fact, she made no reference at all to the Law or
the Kapp tests in her reasons. The words “human dignity”, “prejudice” or
“stereotype” — words that have so bedevilled the Supreme Court of
Canada’s constitutional equality rights jurisprudence — are nowhere to
be found in Abella J.’s opinion in Moore. It would have been better if she
had stated explicitly that the additional requirement that constitutional
equality rights claimants have had to establish — a violation of human
dignity (from 1999 to 2008 in the Law era), or the perpetuation of disadvantage through the operation of prejudice or stereotyping (2008 to 2013
in the Kapp era) — should not be part of the claimant’s burden in the
statutory realm. But such an additional burden has never been part of the
Court’s statutory equality rights jurisprudence,79 so Abella J. may have
considered an affirmative statement along those lines unnecessary, even
though she had been urged to address the issue in the submissions described above. In any case, a few months later, as we shall see in our
discussion of Quebec v. A. below, Abella J. held that proof of the
76
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operation of prejudice or stereotyping is no longer a requirement that
must be met to establish violations of section 15 of the Charter.
Applying the O’Malley test, Abella J. had no difficulty finding that
Mr. Moore had a disability (dyslexia), and that the adverse impact he
endured was related to his disability.80 She went on to conclude that he
was denied meaningful access to a service (the general education available to the public) on the basis of his disability, because the remediation
provided by the school district “was far from adequate to give Jeffrey the
education to which he was entitled”.81
Turning to the issue of justification, the question was whether the
school district had demonstrated that there were no reasonable or
practical alternatives to the denial of intensive remediation services to
Mr. Moore in light of the budgetary crisis it faced.82 Justice Abella
concluded that the school district had not met its burden, as special needs
programs were cut disproportionately and not accorded the constitutional
priority they deserved.83 Moreover, “the District undertook no
assessment, financial or otherwise, of what alternatives were or could be
reasonably available to accommodate special needs students if the
Diagnostic Centre were closed”.84 This failure undermined the school
district’s argument that budgetary constraints prevented it from providing
meaningful access to education to Mr. Moore: “[i]n order to decide that it
had no other choice, it had at least to consider what those other choices
were”.85
The finding of discrimination against the District was thus confirmed
unanimously by the Supreme Court of Canada. Justice Abella upheld the
Tribunal’s award of monetary damages to the Moores for the costs of the
private special education they had to incur and for the injury to Jeffrey’s
“dignity, feelings and self-respect”.86 She reversed the Tribunal’s systemic orders directed at the school district and the provincial
government, finding them too remotely related to the finding of discrimination against Jeffrey.87
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The Moore ruling is the most powerful ruling on equality rights from
the Court since its rulings in the late 1990s in Eldridge88 and Vriend.89
Justice Abella’s opinion is eloquent, succinct and compelling. The Court
was united around her application of settled jurisprudence. As a result,
the Court in Moore was able to provide clear guidance to school boards
regarding their obligations to prioritize available resources to promote
equal access to educational services for persons with disabilities, just as
the Eldridge ruling had clarified hospitals’ obligations to provide equal
access to public health care services to the hearing impaired. Moreover,
Abella J.’s restatement and application of the O’Malley test for
discrimination, carefully omitting any reference to the leading cases
setting out the test for discrimination in the Charter context, and carefully
omitting the terminology (human dignity, prejudice, stereotype) that has
imposed added burdens on equality rights claimants in section 15 cases,
provides a clear indication to lower courts that they should do the same.
Lower courts and tribunals no longer need to worry about whether to
incorporate proof of a violation of “human dignity” or “the perpetuation
of disadvantage through the operation of prejudice or stereotyping” into
the statutory test for discrimination. To the extent that earlier lower court
or tribunal rulings did incorporate this added burden into the statutory
test for discrimination, such as the Ontario Court of Appeal ruling in
Tranchemontagne,90 they are no longer reliable statements of the law in
light of the Court’s rulings in Moore and Quebec v. A.
The Court’s other recent equality rights ruling in the case of Quebec
v. A.91 is more complicated and its implications less clear, because the
judges were closely divided and wrote four separate opinions. At issue
were provisions of the Quebec Civil Code92 that accord rights to spousal
support, the family residence, the family patrimony, the compensatory
allowance and the partnership of acquests only to married spouses or to
persons in civil unions. The claimant Ms. A had lived with Mr. B for
seven years in a conjugal relationship. They had three children together.
She wanted to marry, but he refused. When they separated, Ms. A found
herself without access to the spousal support and property rights in the
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Civil Code. She brought a challenge to the provisions of the Civil Code
on constitutional grounds.
Was it discrimination on the basis of marital status, and thus an infringement of section 15(1) of the Charter, for the Quebec National
Assembly to exclude de facto spouses (that is, unmarried couples living
together in conjugal relationships) from these statutory rights? If so,
could the government justify the infringement pursuant to section 1 of
the Charter?
If we were to apply the O’Malley test from the statutory realm for
determining violations of section 15(1), the claimant would have to establish that the challenged provisions imposed adverse differential
impact on the basis of the prohibited ground of marital status (which has
been recognized by the Court as analogous to the other grounds listed in
section 15). This was the straightforward and well-established approach
around which the Court united in Moore. Then the burden could quickly
shift to the government to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination by
establishing a justification in accordance with section 1 of the Charter.
But no such luck. Quebec v. A. was a constitutional equality rights
case. A set of anxieties not present in the statutory jurisprudence apparently were summoned forth. The Court in Quebec v. A. produced a
lengthy and complicated ruling featuring four separate opinions that cumulatively consumed 450 paragraphs. The opinions resulted in two
closely divided rulings on the section 15(1) and section 1 issues, respectively, that revealed a starkly gendered division among the judges.
First, a 5-4 majority, featuring a lead opinion written by Abella J.,
and two separate concurring opinions written by Deschamps J. (joined by
Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ.) and the Chief Justice, found that the impugned provisions of the Civil Code discriminated on the basis of marital
status and thus infringed section 15(1) of the Charter. In other words, the
four women on the Court, joined by Cromwell J., found the denial of
rights to de facto spouses to be discriminatory. The four other men on the
Court dissented in an opinion written by LeBel J. (Fish, Rothstein and
Moldaver JJ. concurring). Justice LeBel’s dissent is remarkable both for
its length (282 paragraphs) and for its conclusion that none of the challenged provisions infringe section 15(1) because they do not express or
perpetuate prejudice or stereotyping. Justice LeBel’s dissent should stand
as a reminder why members of disadvantaged groups should be relieved
of the burden of proving that the disadvantage imposed on them by the
government operated through prejudice or stereotyping.
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Second, a differently constituted 5-4 majority affirmed the validity of
the challenged provisions. The majority in the result consisted of LeBel J.’s
opinion for four members of the Court that the impugned provisions of
the Civil Code did not infringe section 15(1) and the Chief Justice’s conclusion that the infringement of section 15(1) could be justified pursuant
to section 1, because “the Quebec law falls within a range of reasonable
alternatives for maximizing choice and autonomy in the matter of family
assets and support”.93 In their dissenting opinions on the section 1 issues,
Abella J. would have found none of the impugned provisions to be justified, and Deschamps J. (Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. concurring)
would have found them all to be justified apart from the provision dealing with spousal support rights.
The Court’s opinions in Quebec v. A. raise a multitude of interesting
questions. Here, I will focus only on what members of the Court had to
say about the approach to the claimant’s burden in establishing an infringement of section 15(1). As noted above, in Kapp the Court
committed to relieving the undue burdens its previous jurisprudence had
placed on claimants asserting violations of their constitutional equality
rights. It did so by eliminating the need to prove a violation of human
dignity. The Court continued the project of reducing the burdens placed
on section 15(1) claimants in Withler by eliminating the need to structure
the discrimination analysis around a single “mirror comparator group”.
The test put forward by the majority in Quebec v. A. continues the postKapp trajectory of alleviating the burdens on section 15(1) claimants,
and calling on the government to justify, pursuant to section 1 of the
Charter, laws or policies that have the effect of imposing adverse differential treatment on the basis of prohibited grounds on members of
historically disadvantaged groups.
As discussed above, prior to the Court’s ruling in Quebec v. A., the
test for determining violations of section 15(1) was set out in Kapp and
Withler as follows: “(1) Does the law create a distinction based on an
enumerated or analogous ground? (2) Does the distinction create a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping?”94 In her opinion for
the majority on section 15(1), Abella J. reformulated this test in several
important ways.
First, Justice Abella stated that, contrary to the impression left in Kapp
and Withler, the claimant is not required to prove that the challenged
93
94
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law perpetuates prejudice or stereotyping.95 Rather, “[p]rejudice and
stereotyping are two of the indicia that may help answer” whether the
challenged law violates substantive equality; “they are not discrete
elements of the test which the claimant is obliged to demonstrate”.96
Second, she resolved an ambiguity in the earlier case law about the
meaning of the word “prejudice”. Sometimes, the Court appeared to use
the word “prejudice” as a synonym for “disadvantage” (as in, “does the
challenged law impose prejudice or disadvantage on the claimant”?). On
other occasions, the Court appeared to use prejudice as meaning a discriminatory bad attitude. In Quebec v. A., Abella J. clearly opted for the
latter meaning. She defined prejudice as follows:
Prejudice is the holding of pejorative attitudes based on strongly held
views about the appropriate capacities or limits of individuals or the
groups of which they are a member. Stereotyping, like prejudice, is a
disadvantaging attitude, but one that attributes characteristics to
members of a group regardless of their actual capacities. Attitudes of
prejudice and stereotyping can undoubtedly lead to discriminatory
conduct, and discriminatory conduct in turn can reinforce these
negative attitudes …97

While the proof that differential treatment on a prohibited ground
perpetuates prejudicial or stereotypical attitudes will be sufficient to establish discrimination, it is not necessary.98 Justice Abella noted that such
a requirement would impose an “unquantifiable” or “ineffable” burden
on claimants.99 The focus, she said, should remain resolutely on the impact of the challenged law.100
Third, drawing on Kapp and Withler, Abella J. clarified the other
way, apart from proving the perpetuation of prejudice or stereotype, that
a section 15(1) claimant may establish discrimination: by showing that
the challenged differential treatment on the basis of a prohibited ground
imposes a disadvantage on the claimant as a member of a group that has
experienced a history of disadvantage:
The root of s. 15 is our awareness that certain groups have been
historically discriminated against, and that the perpetuation of such
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discrimination should be curtailed. If the state conduct widens the gap
between the historically disadvantaged group and the rest of society
101
rather than narrowing it, then it is discriminatory.

Justice Abella emphasized that a consideration of the purpose of the
challenged provisions — whether they are well-motivated or reasonable
in their promotion of the autonomy of de facto spouses, for example —
properly belongs at the section 1 stage of the analysis.102 For this reason,
she and the other members of the section 15(1) majority declined to follow
the Court’s ruling in Walsh103 to the effect that Nova Scotia legislation
extending family property rights only to married spouses did not violate
the section 15(1) rights of unmarried couples.104
After clarifying and adjusting the section 15(1) test in these ways,
Abella J. was able to quickly conclude that the impugned provisions infringed section 15(1). The law imposed disadvantageous treatment based
on marital status on a group — de facto spouses — that had experienced
historic disadvantage. Some de facto spouses were in relationships functionally similar to some marriages, giving rise to similar forms of
economic vulnerability. This was enough for Abella J. to conclude that an
infringement of section 15(1) was established:
The National Assembly enacted economic safeguards for spouses in
formal unions based on the need to protect them from the economic
consequences of their assumed roles. Since many spouses in de
facto couples exhibit the same functional characteristics as those in
101
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formal unions, with the same potential for one partner to be left
economically vulnerable or disadvantaged when the relationship
ends, their exclusion from similar protections perpetuates
historic disadvantage against them based on their marital status.105

In her opinion, Deschamps J. (Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ.
concurring) wrote that she agreed with Abella J.’s section 15(1) analysis.106
In her brief additional comments, she made clear that establishing
differential treatment on a prohibited ground that perpetuates historic
disadvantage is sufficient to show an infringement of section 15(1) and to
require the government to meet its burden of justification pursuant to
section 1. The brevity and clarity of Deschamps J.’s section 15(1) analysis
is reminiscent of the relative ease with which the Court found prima facie
discrimination in cases involving statutory claims, like Meiorin and
Moore. Here is Deschamps J.’s section 15(1) discussion in its entirety:
The exclusion of de facto spouses from the protections provided for in
the C.C.Q. [Civil Code of Quebec] perpetuates a historical disadvantage
(Withler, at paras. 3, 35, 37 and 54). The Court has recognized the fact
of being unmarried as an analogous ground because, historically,
unmarried persons were considered to have adopted a lifestyle less
worthy of respect than that of married persons. For this reason, they
were excluded from the social protections. Even though society’s
perception of de facto spouses has changed in recent decades and there
is no indication that the Quebec legislature intended to stigmatize them,
the denial of the benefits in question perpetuates the disadvantage such
people have historically experienced (Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R.
418, at para. 152). The Attorney General of Quebec therefore had to
107
justify this distinction.

Recall that the O’Malley test for prima facie discrimination in the
statutory realm requires the claimant to show that the challenged rule
imposes adverse differential treatment based on a prohibited ground.
The majority opinions on section 15(1) of Abella and Deschamps JJ.
in Quebec v. A. likewise require a section 15(1) claimant to demonstrate
adverse differential treatment on a prohibited ground that exacerbates
historic disadvantage. Insofar as members of historically disadvantaged
groups are concerned, these are essentially the same tests.
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Chief Justice McLachlin, in her separate opinion, was the fifth member of the majority finding a violation of section 15(1). The Chief Justice
stated, without qualification, that she was in agreement with “the s. 15
analysis set out in Abella J.’s reasons”.108 However, in her discussion of
why section 15(1) was violated in this case, the Chief Justice’s emphasis
on “the point of view of a reasonable person”,109 and on the “false stereotypes”110 underlying the law, raise some doubt about whether she shares
Abella and Deschamps JJ.’s view that the exacerbation of historic disadvantage on the basis of prohibited grounds is sufficient to meet the
claimant’s section 15(1) case and move the analysis on to the government’s burden of justification under section 1. Moreover, the ease with
which the Chief Justice upheld the challenged provisions in their entirety
pursuant to section 1111 raises concerns that the changes to the section
15(1) test put forward by Abella J. in Quebec v. A. may not have an impact
on the results of Charter equality rights cases. Even if the section 15(1)
majority led by Abella J. holds in future cases, it may simply shift an
approach that has been highly deferential to government from section 15
to section 1.

IV. CONCLUSION
The ruling in Quebec v. A. is the third instalment in the Supreme
Court of Canada’s ongoing efforts to revise its section 15 jurisprudence
to reduce the burdens on equality rights claimants. The Court recognized,
beginning in Kapp, that its section 15 jurisprudence had placed burdens
on equality rights claimants that were inimical to the achievement of
section 15’s purpose of promoting substantive equality. Interpreting
section 15 in light of its substantive equality purpose, the Court has
emphasized that section 15(1) should prevent the exacerbation of
disadvantage experienced by members of historically disadvantaged
groups, and that section 15(2) should permit governments to initiate
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programs aimed at improving their situation.112 The purpose of section
15 is to identify and transform persistent patterns of social exclusion and
subordination on the basis of grounds that are unreliable markers of a
person’s merits and capacities and generally irrelevant to legitimate
government objectives.
If legislatures and governments act contrary to the purpose of section 15,
as they have throughout Canadian history, the substantive equality
purpose of section 15 requires that members of disadvantaged groups
have meaningful access to meaningful remedies. The Constitution has
placed the primary responsibility for delivering those remedies on the
courts. However, access to the courts is hindered by the high costs of
litigation, and those costs are exacerbated, and access to remedies
hindered, by high procedural, evidentiary or legal burdens imposed on
claimants. A paradox lies at the heart of section 15: its chief intended
beneficiaries, the most disadvantaged members of our society, are also the
least likely to be able to afford to pursue litigation seeking vindication of
their equality rights. Equality rights jurisprudence needs to be responsive
to this paradox, even if it is not capable of resolving it on its own.
The Court has acknowledged the need to reconsider its jurisprudence
to ensure it is aligned with section 15’s substantive equality purposes.
The first step in this process came in Kapp, when the Court jettisoned the
human dignity test articulated in Law. The second instalment involved
the rejection, in Withler, of the mirror comparator group requirement put
forward in Auton and Hodge. In Quebec v. A., Justice Abella’s majority
opinion on section 15(1) rejected the requirement of proving the
operation of prejudice or stereotype set out in Kapp and Withler, and
refused to follow the Court’s ruling in Walsh. These changes are all
aimed at promoting section 15’s substantive equality purpose. The focus
of section 15(1) analysis, Abella J. affirmed, should be on the effects of a
challenged law and on transforming laws or government practices that
have adverse differential impact on the members of historically
disadvantaged groups.
These important adjustments to the section 15(1) jurisprudence ought
to relieve the burdens on section 15(1) claimants and allow the analysis
to move more quickly to section 1, where government should have to
show why it cannot achieve its objectives without imposing adverse
differential impact on historically disadvantaged groups on the basis of
112
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prohibited grounds. The substantive equality purpose of section 15
requires that the Court be willing to hold the government to a meaningful
burden of justification under section 1 when infringements of section 15
are found.
While we ought to applaud the Court’s willingness to undertake
these important reconsiderations of section 15(1) doctrine, we should
also retain a healthy dose of skepticism about whether they will actually
produce different results. The best constitutional equality rights jurisprudence in the world is not going to help those who cannot afford the
resources necessary to put the Court’s fine words to work. Section 15’s
high aspirations are a cruel hoax if we cannot find effective ways to enable the most disadvantaged Canadians to put them into practice.
The McLachlin Court’s record on Charter equality rights is distinguished by two features: one is its doctrinal plasticity, the remarkable
series of about-turns and mea culpas one finds in the Court’s section 15
rulings during the last decade. The recent adjustments to the jurisprudence are promising, but it is too early to say whether the Court will stay
on the path it has charted. The dissenting opinion of LeBel J. in Quebec
v. A., on behalf of four members of the Court, is a reminder that future
section 15 rulings could continue to require disadvantaged Canadians to
navigate complicated hurdles before the government is required to justify
the imposition of further disadvantage on the members of groups that
have endured persistent patterns of social subordination on the basis of
irrelevant personal characteristics. The Chief Justice’s decisive opinion
maintains some troubling elements of section 15(1)’s past, and takes a
highly deferential approach to the government’s burden of justification
pursuant to section 1.
The other distinguishing feature of the McLachlin Court’s section 15
jurisprudence is its consistent record of dismissing Charter equality
rights claims, or denying leave to appeal to promising Charter equality
rights claims, regardless of the operative test for discrimination at the
time. In this sense, there is nothing new about Quebec v. A.; it is just another example of the Court dismissing a Charter equality rights claim in a
lengthy and complicated set of opinions.
In light of the inaccessibility of Charter litigation, and the
uncertainties produced by the instability and divisions in judicial
approaches to section 15, statutory equality rights administered by
human rights commissions and tribunals will continue to play a dominant
role in promoting substantive equality. As we have seen, in recent years
the contributions of human rights tribunals to the development of anti-
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discrimination law, and to the delivery of remedies to equality rights
claimants, far outstrip the contributions courts have made in section 15
rulings. The Court has wisely resisted calls made primarily by
government lawyers to place new burdens on equality rights claimants in
the statutory realm. In other words, the Court has not made the same
mistakes in the context of statutory equality rights that have hindered the
pursuit of substantive equality in the constitutional equality rights context.
In cases like Meiorin and Moore, the Court has issued clear, confident and
succinct rulings that have been successful in aligning the interpretation of
statutory equality rights with the promotion of substantive equality. The
Moore ruling, by affirming the simplicity of the O’Malley test for
determining prima facie discrimination, should help forestall any further
attempts to rely on Charter jurisprudence to elevate the burdens on
equality rights claimants in the statutory context. The complete absence of
the words prejudice or stereotype in Abella J.’s opinion in Moore, coupled
with her removal of the need to prove the operation of prejudice or
stereotyping from the section 15 test in her opinion in Quebec v. A.,
should help focus the statutory and constitutional tests alike on the goal of
promoting substantive equality for members of disadvantaged groups.
The division of labour between the claimant’s affirmative case of
prima facie discrimination, and the defences and justificatory arguments
available to respondents set out in leading cases such as O’Malley and
Meiorin has proven to be flexible and effective in the adjudication of
statutory equality rights. A similar approach can work just as well when
adjudicating constitutional equality rights in the context of section 15 and
section 1 of the Charter. There is no need to impose additional burdens on
equality rights claimants in either the statutory or constitutional realms. In
both contexts, members of historically disadvantaged groups should have
to establish adverse differential treatment on the basis of prohibited
grounds. The burden of establishing a defence or justification should then
shift to respondents. The Court’s unanimous opinion in Moore, and the
opinions for the section 15(1) majority in Quebec v. A., bring us two large
steps closer to just such a harmonized approach, one that would spell the
end of the strange double life of Canadian equality rights.

